I just finished reading George Tenet's book, "At the Center of the Storm."

It reminded me that there's always someone with a more stressful job, almost no matter what you do. I have been under some enormous pressure at work recently, trying to resolve a situation that bears little resemblence to the set of risks and activities I normally undertake on the job. Someday, maybe I will get to write about it on this thread. But today is not that day. The point being, George Tenet (during his time at the CIA) and many people at the CIA face pressures that make what I face seem like spilled milk at a picnic.

Back on May 2nd, I wrote a blog entry that quoted some withering criticism of Tenet, and I mentioned that I would read the book. Which I did.

While I have not become a Tenet fan, I definitely have more nuanced understanding of what the CIA accomplished and did not accomplish during Tenet's tenure. Of course, the book was written in part in to help shape Tenet's legacy and to try to provide a vigorous defense against the fierce criticism the CIA has come in for in recent years. But here's why Tenet's book has so much credibility and and should be widely read: He admits mistakes. Crazy concept, I know, but Tenet takes ownership for certain colossal blunders in plain, simple language that doesn't minimize the consequences or pass the buck. With that kind of honesty, the other things he has to say have so much more credibility.

Tenets's harshest critics will never be convinced; they might say that his admission of mistakes was just a contrived device to enhance his credibility in other areas where he seeks to burnish his image. But I don't buy it. Read the book and judge for yourself; it's well worth your time. Here's three interesting passages:

From p 338-339: In the Sping of 2004, during one of my final appearances before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Congressman Norman Dicks commented on the NIE [the National Intelligence Estimate prepared before the war, that essentially said that Iraq had WMD]. Norm is a longtime friend of the intelligence community and of mine personally. Yet he had harsh words for me that day. Regarding the Estimate, and the faith he had in me, he said, "We depended on you, and you let us down." For me, it was one of the lowest moments of my seven-year tenure, because I knew he was right.

And on p. 253: While we could, and sometimes did, simply present a check to the [foreign] intelligence service responsible for helping us capture a major terrorist, we would occasionally opt for a more dramatic approach. We would show up in someone's office, offer our thanks, and we would leave behind a briefcase full of crisp one-hundred dollar bills, sometimes totaling more than a million in a single transaction.

And later on p 253: I also has the opportunity to meet the foreign agent who led us to KSM [Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the operational mastermind behind September 11]. The man bought his first suit to wear to our meeting. I thanked him for his courage and expressed our gratitude for what he had done. He embraced me, looked me in the eye, and asked just one question. "Do you think President Bush knows of my role in this capture?" I smiled. "Yes, he does," I said, "because I told him." The fellow beamed with pride. "Does he know my name?" he asked. "No. Because that's a secret he doesn't need to know," I replied. I asked the man why he had agreed to help us and place his life at risk. His answer goes to the heart of the struggle we're involved in against terrorists worldwide: "I want my children free of these madmen who distort our religion and kill innocent people," he told me.